I argue that quantum mechanics is a realistic theory, but it violates either strong locality (no superluminal influences) or strict causality (diiferent effects cannot follow from the same cause).
In a recent 'comment' Griffiths [1] has criticized the statement by Wiseman [2] that the loophole-free violation of a Bell inequality is the death for local realism. Indeed Griffiths claims that "quantum theory itself is both local and realistic when properly interpreted using a quantum Hilbert space rather than the classical hidden variables". I believe that there are people supporting Wiseman and people supporting Griffiths. Indeed it is an old debate, renewed by the new experiments. The purpose of this note is to make a short contribution to the debate.
Realism Experiments in physics usually consist of getting information about physical systems in specific states. A particular state is obtained after an appropriate preparation and the information is usually got via measurments. To be general enough I will consider that the result of the measurement is statistical, so that the relevant result obtained from the experiment is a probability P . I propose defining realism as the hypothesis that physics makes statements about an external reality independent of the observers. Thus measurements provide information about something existing even if nothing is measured. As a consequence a necessary condition for realism is that the probability of the result, a, when the observable A is measured depends on the observable measured and the state of the system, λ, which may be written
This is valid in both classical and quantum physics. The classical case is well known. But eq. (1) is also valid for a quantum system provided that λ represents a vector ψ in the Hilbert space, or more generally a density operatorρ. In fact quantum mechanics predicts the following probability density, ρ (a) for the (continuous) variable a
A being the quantum operator associated to the observable A. I have written eq.(1) for a discrete variable a because it is easier to understand, but eq.(2) for a continuous variable because it is a standard quantum formula. For the sake of simplicity in this note I will consider observables with values {0, 1} where the probability agrees with the expectation, that is
I conclude that both classical and quantum physics are realistic theories in the sense above defined.
Causality vs. completeness Since the foundational days a debate took place concerning completeness vs. incompleteness of quantum mechanics, Bohr and Einstein respectively being the most conspicuous proponents. Here I will comment on a related, and deeper, question namely whether there is strict causality in nature. The history of science has always being the search for causal connections between events and therefore it is hard to believe that strict causality does not hold true. However there are empirical facts that have led many people to propose that strict causality is not valid at the microscopic level. If strict causality does not hold, then necessarily quantum mechanics should be incomplete.
It is a fact that the results of several runs of a measurement have a dispersion even if the preparation of the state and the measuring set-up are identical, as far as we can control. In classical physics there is dispersion too, but it is usually small. In contrast in quantum physics the dispersion may be quite large. There are two possible interpretations of this fact. If we support strict causality in the natural world then the dispersion of the measurement results should be a consequence of incomplete information, due to lack of control of all possible variables in the preparation or the measurement. This is the usual assumption in classical physics. However in the quantum case many people believes that the dispersion is a consequence of the absence of strict causality in nature, that is the existence of a kind of fundamental randomness such that different effects may follow from precisely the same cause.
If we assume strict causality we should write the probability eq.(2) in the form
where {λ} is a set of 'hidden' states and {w λ } the associated weights. That is we should suppose that quantum mechanics is incomplete [3] and might be completed with subquantum (real, ontic) states, {λ} . (A more popular name for λ is hidden variable). It is the case that the quantum formalism is compatible with eq.(4) in simple instances. In fact we may introduce in eq.(3) a resolution of the identity
where {| λ } is a complete orthonormal set of eigenstates ofÂ with eigenvalues {λ}, leading to
which agrees with eq.(4) , the quantities | λ | ψ | 2 playing the role of w λ and the Kronecker delta δ λ1 the role of P λ (A = 1).
I have illustrated the argument with a simple example, but the generalization to several arbitrary commuting observables is straightforward. For instance if we have two observables A and B whose associated operator commute, the probability that both have the value 1 equals the correlation, that is P (A = B = 1) = ψ ÂB ψ .
The existence of a complete set of orthonormal eigenstates {| λ } is guaranteed by the commutativity of the operators and similar steps as those above lead to
where I have taken into account that | λ is an eigenvector of the projector A with eigenvalue either 1 or 0, and similar forB. In summary if we support strict causality we should assume that quantum mechanics is incomplete and eqs. (4) to (8) may be interpreted as an explanation for the dispersion of the measurement results. In contrast if we support fundamental randomness, no explanation is needed and those equations may be seen as just formal developments devoid of any physical interpretation.
Strict causality is closely related to determinism, but some authors make a distinction. In fact due to some unavoidable noise, usually attributed to vacuum fluctuations [4] , we might have strict causality but practical randomness, i. e. practical lack of determinism. But I shall not discuss this question anymore here.
Locality The question of locality involves measurements made, by Alice and Bob, in distant places (or more strictly in space-like separated regions in the sense of relativity theory). Thus we consider a system consisting of two separated subsystems in the global state ψ and two measurements, one on each subsystem, corresponding to the observables A and B. We will assume that these observables are defined for Alice's and Bob's subsystems respectively. Both observables are jointly measurable if the associated operators commute, which is always true if the measurements are space-like separated. In fact quantum field theory postulates that the field operators commute in that case, and we should assume that the operatorsÂ andB are functions of the field operators. Eqs. (7) and (8) 
We assume that A is a property of Alice's subsystem whilst both B and C are properties of Bob's subsystem. For any correlation between A and B we may arrive at a construction like eq.(8) . Similarly any correlation between A and C may be written in a similar form, namely
where {| µ } is a complete orthonormal set of simultaneous eigenstates ofÂ andĈ. However a problem arises, namely the states, | µ , of the system involved in eq.(10) are different from those, | λ , involved in eq.(8) . No simple physical explanation may be given to this formal feature. A possible interpretation might be that both the quantum states | λ and | µ are actually mixtures of some set of 'subquantum' states, say ν, such that all quantum states may be written in terms of them. That is
this simbolic expression meaning that λ (the quantum state represented by | λ in the Hilbert space formalism) is a mixture of the subquantum states ν with weights p (ν; λ) , and similar for µ. If this is the case, taking eq.(11) into account both correlations ψ ÂB ψ and ψ ÂĈ ψ could be written in the classical-like form eq.(3) . However this is not possible in general: as a consequence of Bell's theorem [5] no set {ν} exist allowing to express both correlations in terms of states of this set. In fact, any value of ν would attach a definite value to every one of the three observables A, B and C, thus givin rise to a joint probability distribution of a set of observables (with values {0, 1}). But the existence of such a distribution implies the fulfillement of all Bell inequalities [6] , which does not hold true in some cases. Thus there seems to be some nonlocal (superluminal) influence between Alice's and Bob's subsystems. We migh say that a strong form of locality ('superluminal influences' do not exist) is violated. However a weak form of locality is compatible with quantum mechanics, which is usually named 'no signalling' [7] . It forbids only superluminal signals, but not superluminal influences. (I use weak and strong in the sense that strong⇒weak). Conclusions 1. Quantum mechanics is a realistic theory. 2. Quantum mechanics either violates strict causality or it violates at least a strong form of locality. The alternative is dramatic because both terms of the dilemma are cherised principles of classical physics. Indeed Einstein supported both.
If we pass from the quantum theory to the empirical facts, the same alternative appears provided a loophole-free violation of a Bell inequality is produced, which seems to be the case according to recently reported experimental results.
